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I.

INTRODUCTION

We are unquestionably a liquor-loving society. Alcohol is a
part of daily life for many Americans; for some it is a refreshing
beverage, for others a social enabler, and for still others a potent
drug and perhaps a dangerous addiction. Alcohol has been and
continues to be a powerful force, spurring protests and debates and
giving rise to activist groups throughout history and in modern
society. Alcohol occupies a unique position in history as the only
1
substance to inspire not one, but two constitutional amendments.
Alcohol, whether good or evil, has incited a war that has been
ongoing since the nation’s beginning. Its numerous battles have
been at times more than figurative, resulting in violence and lost or
destroyed lives. Other battles have been fought in loftier settings.
2
The case of Granholm v. Heald represents a turning point in the
nearly two-century-old battle fought between the courts and the
legislature over the extent of state power to control the importation
3
and distribution of liquor within the states’ borders. For nearly
200 years, Congress has fought to give states complete control over
liquor regulation only to have their efforts frustrated by the
4
Supreme Court at every turn. For a number of years following the
Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification it appeared that states had at

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of alcoholic beverages); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII). Demonstrating the uniqueness of these amendments is
the fact that there are only two ways an ordinary citizen can violate the
Constitution. Gordon Eng, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to
Balancing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct
Shipping of Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1849, 1849 (2003). One way is by enslaving
someone and the other is by “bring[ing] a bottle of wine into a state in violation of
its alcoholic beverage control laws.” Id.
2. 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
3. See infra Part II. See generally Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1898-1905 (outlining
the history of the struggle for control over liquor regulation).
4. See generally Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1898-1905.
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last won the war, with the Supreme Court seeming to cede control.
In recent years, however, the Court has gradually been reclaiming
the power it had abdicated. The Granholm decision represents the
Court’s furthest reach into states’ Twenty-first Amendment power
since the Amendment’s ratification.
5
The popularly termed “wine wars” are the newest outgrowth
6
of this power struggle, stemming from the complaints of wineries
7
and oenophiles that state laws which ban direct wine shipments
from out-of-state wineries to in-state consumers are
8
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Granholm, ruling that states may not discriminate
against out-of-state wineries by allowing in-state wineries to ship
their products directly to customers, while requiring out-of-state

5. Lisa Lucas, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 902 (2005).
6. The wine wars have been brought on by developments in e-commerce as
well as changes in the wine industry. See Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old
Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563, 159192 (2004); see also Eng, supra note 1, at 1880 (explaining the factors giving rise to
the wine wars, such as the development of e-commerce, changes in the structure
of the wholesale liquor industry, and the rise in number and quality of wineries).
7. Merriam-Webster defines oenophile as “a lover or connoisseur of wine.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 806 (10th ed. 1993). Not only are we
a liquor-loving society, but more than ever we are a wine-loving society. The grape
crop in the United States has more than tripled in the past fifteen years, with wine
grapes composing two-thirds of that total. American Wine Society, Wine and
Grape Education, http://www.americanwinesociety.org/web/wine_facts_
figures.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). Wine consumption has been steadily
growing since the early 1990s, climbing from 176 million cases of wine consumed
in 1996 to an unprecedented 232 million cases in 2003. Id. The number of small
wineries producing less than 5000 cases of wine per year is growing rapidly,
currently standing at over 4000. Michael Barbaro, Small Wineries May Benefit,
WASH.
POST,
May
17,
2005,
at
A06,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/16/
AR2005051601523.html. However, the number of distributors has decreased and
small wineries have difficulty finding a distributor that is not too expensive and
willing to deal with small companies. Id. For this reason, direct shipment to
consumers is an essential part of business for many small wineries.
8. Lucas, supra note 5, at 899. Direct shipment laws currently take many
forms. Prince, supra note 6, at 1592. Some states ban direct shipments of wine
altogether and even make direct shipment in violation of the laws a felony. Id.
Other states place various types of restrictions on direct shipments. Id. Some
“reciprocity” states allow direct shipments only from states that also allow direct
shipments. Id. For details on each state’s current direct shipment laws, see
WineAmerica, Shipping Law, http://www.wineamerica.org/shipment/law.htm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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9

wineries to utilize commercial distributors.
This Case Note begins by summarizing the history of the
Commerce Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment, and the legal
10
battle over the balance between the two provisions. It then briefly
outlines the facts, reasoning, and holding in the two appellate
11
court decisions consolidated by the Supreme Court and explains
12
the majority and dissenting viewpoints in Granholm. Next it argues
that the reasoning employed by the majority defies existing law and
leads to results most likely never intended by those who ratified the
13
Twenty-first Amendment.
Nevertheless, the result the majority
imposed may be appropriate for modern society. This Case Note
concludes by proposing an alternate line of analysis that must be
14
undertaken before straying from well-established precedent.
II. HISTORY
A.

The Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause of the Constitution vests in Congress
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
15
The
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”
importance of the Commerce Clause is demonstrated by the fact
that the problem of regulating commerce was one of the main
16
reasons for the meeting of the Constitutional Convention. The
framers thought that regulation of commerce by the federal
government was necessary to stem competition between states and
to discourage the “economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
17
Articles of Confederation.”
The Commerce Clause acts not only as a grant of power over
interstate commerce to Congress, but also as a limitation on state
18
power.
The “dormant” Commerce Clause, as this principle is
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1907.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005).
Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 1 (2005).
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termed, is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Rather, it is
generally considered to be the logical inverse of the plenary grant
20
of commerce power to Congress. The dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits states from making laws “designed to benefit in-state
21
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” It was
this principle that the Supreme Court used to defeat early attempts
by states to impose local prohibition, and it is this principle that the
Court returned to in Granholm to defeat state liquor laws once
22
again.
B.

Pre-Prohibition Liquor Regulation

Prompted by the temperance movement, state attempts to
23
impose local prohibition began years before federal Prohibition.
The Supreme Court established early on that a state may regulate
the manufacture and sale of liquor within its borders as an exercise
24
of its police power. The Court, however, was less solicitous of laws
that prevented liquor manufactured outside a state’s borders from
25
entering the state. Relying on the dormant Commerce Clause,
the Court struck down attempts to prohibit the importation of
26
alcohol and held that liquor produced out-of-state could be
imported and sold in its original package free from the effects of
27
state law. After these decisions, states that wanted to be “dry” were
19. Prince, supra note 6, at 1568.
20. Id. at 1568-69.
21. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 1 (2005).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897-98 (2005). The temperance
movement’s first victory came in 1851 in Maine, with a law that authorized stiff
penalties for selling liquor. JAMES WEST DAVIDSON ET AL., NATION OF NATIONS: A
NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 408 (3d ed. 1998). Subsequently,
other states enacted such laws, but most were either struck down by courts or
repealed. Id. For a complete account of American intemperance, the efforts of
the temperance movement, and the Prohibition era, see THOMAS R. PEGRAM,
BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA 1800-1933 (1998).
24. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (holding that a law
forbidding private citizens from manufacturing or selling liquor is a valid exercise
of the State’s police power and does not infringe the constitutional rights of the
citizen).
25. Prince, supra note 6, at 1574.
26. See Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 493 (1888) (striking
down an Iowa law that prohibited transportation of alcoholic beverages into the
state as a violation of the Commerce Clause).
27. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1890) (holding that police
power attached only after the foreign goods became “mingled in the common
mass of property within the state”). The Court held that the State had no power to
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free to ban liquor—but only liquor that was produced within their
28
own borders.
Recognizing that these decisions rendered states’ prohibition
efforts virtually meaningless, Congress responded in 1890 by
29
passing the Wilson Act, which gave states the authority to regulate
out-of-state liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner” as
30
in-state liquor. The Wilson Act overruled the “original package
doctrine” as applied to alcoholic beverages and prevented out-ofstate liquor from being sold in its original package in violation of
31
state law.
This Act was meant to remedy the effects of the dormant
Commerce Clause on state regulation of alcohol and to enable
32
states to exclude out-of-state liquor. However, the Supreme Court
construed the Wilson Act in a way that stripped it of virtually any
33
34
power that Congress intended it to have. In Scott v. Donald, the
Court struck down a South Carolina statute that provided for a
state monopoly on liquor importation and sale and prohibited instate consumers from ordering out-of-state liquor for their personal
35
use.
The Court stated that the Wilson Act was not meant “to
regulate alcohol so long as it remained in its original package. Id.
28. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1574 (“[E]nterprising individuals could
circumvent their state’s temperance laws by importing alcohol and then reselling
it to in-state consumers—they merely needed to refrain from removing the
liquor’s out-of-state packaging.”).
29. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C.
§ 121 (2000)).
30. The Act provides:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or
Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State
or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had
been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise.
27 U.S.C. § 121.
31. Prince, supra note 6, at 1574-75. The Supreme Court upheld the Wilson
Act’s constitutionality, recognizing that Congress may “‘provide that certain
designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which
divests them of that character.’” Id. at 1575 (quoting In re Raher, 140 U.S. 545,
562 (1891)).
32. Id. at 1574-75.
33. See id. at 1575.
34. 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
35. Id. at 92-93.
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confer upon any state the power to discriminate injuriously against
the products of other states in articles whose manufacture and use
are not forbidden, and which are therefore the subjects of
36
37
legitimate commerce.”
In Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co. and
38
Rhodes v. Iowa, the Court expanded Scott, upholding the
constitutional right of consumers under the Commerce Clause to
import liquor for their own use, regardless of state law, without
39
violating the Wilson Act. While citizens of dry states could no
longer circumvent liquor laws by selling imported liquor in its
original package, dry states were still unable to remain truly dry,
because citizens were free to import liquor for their own personal
40
use.
The Supreme Court’s construction of the Wilson Act
prompted Congress to react quickly to close the “direct-shipment
41
42
loophole.” Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913 to
43
This Act prohibited “shipment or
remedy the situation.
transportation” of any “intoxicating liquor” into any state or
44
territory in violation of its laws. The Supreme Court upheld the
36. Id. at 100.
37. 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
38. 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
39. Rhodes narrowed the scope of the Wilson Act by holding that the words
“upon arrival” in the Act meant that state liquor law applied to alcoholic beverages
only once they reached their in-state destination. Id. at 421. States could only
regulate liquor once it had been delivered to the consumer. Granholm v. Heald,
125 S. Ct. 1885, 1915-16 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Vance relied on the
holding in Scott, affirming the right of the citizen to import liquor for his own use
free of “onerous and burdensome” regulations that “so hamper and restrict the
exercise of the right as to materially interfere with or in effect, prevent its
enjoyment.” Vance, 170 U.S. at 453.
40. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575.
41. Id.
42. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
43. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575.
44. 27 U.S.C. § 122. This Act provides in full:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means
whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other
intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of
the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, Territory, or District of the
United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, or from any foreign county into any State, Territory, or District
of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or
other intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to
be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original
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constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act in James Clark Distilling Co.
45
v. Western Maryland Railway Co., holding that it was “enacted
simply to extend that which was done by the Wilson Act, that is to
say, its purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of
interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of
46
liquor through such commerce in states contrary to their laws.”
This Act functioned to divest alcohol of its character as an article of
commerce in cases where it was imported into a state in violation of
that state’s laws; consequently, a ban on direct shipments was no
47
longer a violation of the Commerce Clause. The Court did not
get a chance to further construe this Act, since the Eighteenth
Amendment was ratified two years later and produced a temporary
cease-fire in the battle over liquor regulation.
C. Prohibition
48

In January of 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment ushered in
the “noble” but miserably failed “experiment” known as
49
Prohibition.
This Amendment prohibited nationwide the
“manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
50
beverage purposes,” and gave Congress and the states concurrent
51
power to enforce its provisions.
The consequences of the
Amendment were plentiful, but unfortunately those consequences
package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or
District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Id.
45. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
46. Id. at 324.
47. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575-76.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
49. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 279 n.1 (2004) (noting that the term “the
noble experiment” was coined by President Herbert Hoover to describe
Prohibition). The Eighteenth Amendment “appears to be the legal and political
odd-man-out.” Id. at 282. The previous seventeen amendments deal with
governmental structure and issues of fundamental rights. Id. The Eighteenth
Amendment is the first time the process of amending the Constitution has been
used “to address matters as mundane as the manufacturing and sale of a single
class of products.” Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
51. Id. § 2.
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did not include the teetotalism the reformers desired. The “flaws
53
of this ‘one-size-fits-all alcohol regulatory regime’” even led
President Harding to admit that the “noble experiment” had
54
turned into a “nationwide scandal.” The failure of the federal
government to effectively administer Prohibition “hastened the
Eighteenth Amendment’s demise” and led to insistence on state
55
control upon repeal.
D.

The Twenty-First Amendment and the Early Cases

The Twenty-first Amendment was ratified in 1933, repealing
56
Prohibition in Section 1 and prohibiting the “transportation or
importation” of liquor into a state in violation of its laws, in Section
57
2. The plain language of this Amendment seems to vest complete
control over liquor importation in the states—unrestricted by the
dormant Commerce Clause—and in fact, the early cases
58
interpreting the Amendment so held. A line of cases beginning
59
with State Board of Equalization of California v. Young’s Market Co.
interpreted the reach of the Twenty-first Amendment as permitting
60
states to impose discriminatory regulations on liquor imports. In
Young’s Market, the Court upheld a $500 importation fee that the
State imposed on beer, stating that prior to the Twenty-first
Amendment, this provision would have been an unconstitutional
61
burden on interstate commerce.
The Young’s Market Court
52. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 856; Prince, supra note 6, at 1576.
Consequences of the Eighteenth Amendment did include underfunded and
understaffed enforcement; illegal undercover taverns (speakeasies)—which,
unlike pre-Prohibition saloons, welcomed women; rurally-distilled moonshine
which was commonly of low quality and often caused death or blindness; a reversal
of the trend toward beer and wine in favor of hard liquor; and a proliferation of
gangster bootlegging, government corruption, and violence. DAVIDSON ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 856; Prince, supra note 6, at 1576.
53. Prince, supra note 6, at 1576 (quoting Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A
Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 761, 769 (2002)).
54. Id. at 1576 (quoting LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BUREAU OF
PROHIBITION 46 (1929)).
55. Id. at 1576-77.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
57. Id. § 2. “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” Id.
58. Prince, supra note 6, at 1582-83.
59. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
60. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1582.
61. 299 U.S. at 62. Although this provision was discriminatory, in that it
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explained that “[t]he words used [in the Amendment] are apt to
confer upon the state the power to forbid all importations which
62
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.”
The
Court reasoned that the Twenty-first Amendment would certainly
allow a state to maintain a monopoly over liquor and forbid
63
importation altogether. If this is so, then the greater power to
forbid importation must surely encompass the lesser power to place
64
restrictions on imports.
Several other cases soon followed, challenging restrictions on
liquor importation, and the Court continued to uphold the laws
under the Twenty-first Amendment. In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
65
Liquor Control Commission, the Court upheld a discriminatory
statute, stating that “whatever its character, the law is valid” since
“the right of a state [under the Twenty-first Amendment] to
prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not
66
limited by the commerce clause.” The Court continued with this
67
line of reasoning for a number of years. It was not until 1964 that
the Court began to limit the states’ Twenty-first Amendment power
and impose dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on liquor
regulation once again.

placed a higher burden on out-of-state sellers of beer than in-state sellers, the
Court explained that even if the State had charged in-state sellers an equal fee to
transport beer, the statute still would have violated the Commerce Clause before
the Twenty-first Amendment, because it placed a direct burden on interstate
commerce. Id. The Commerce Clause “confers the right to import merchandise
free into any state, except as Congress may otherwise provide,” but the Twenty-first
Amendment “abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating
liquors.” Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Id.; see also Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).
65. 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
66. Id. at 394.
67. See, e.g., Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 137-38 (“Prior to the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts, and the Twenty-first Amendment, the powers of the States over intoxicants
. . . were limited by the Commerce Clause . . . . The Twenty-first Amendment
sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought
from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.”); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v.
McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939) (Since the Twenty-first Amendment, “the
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not
limited by the commerce clause”); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401,
403 (1938) (“[U]nder the [Twenty-first] [A]mendment, discrimination against
imported liquor is permissible although it is not an incident of the reasonable
regulation of the liquor traffic . . . .”).
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Narrowing Twenty-First Amendment Power

The Supreme Court first indicated that there may be limits to
the states’ Twenty-first Amendment power in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
68
Voyage Liquor Corp. The Court stated that “[t]o draw a conclusion
from [prior cases] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow
operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of
intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be an absurd
69
oversimplification.”
Hostetter concerned a law attempting to
exercise control over liquor being sold for delivery and use in
70
foreign countries. The Court held that since the state’s regulation
was not aimed at liquor intended for delivery or use within the
state, the statute was an impermissible intrusion into Congress’s
71
exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of interstate commerce.
The ruling in Hostetter did not disturb the reasoning
established in the Young’s Market line of cases. However, in 1984
the Supreme Court departed from its well-established precedent
when it seized upon the idea that the Twenty-first Amendment had
72
not repealed the Commerce Clause. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
73
Dias, the Court struck down a Hawaii tax exemption for certain
74
types of locally produced native liquors. The Court held that the
68. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
69. Id. at 331-32. The Court stated that the Twenty-first Amendment and the
Commerce Clause are both parts of the same Constitution and must be considered
in light of one another. Id. at 332.
70. Id. at 333.
71. Id. at 333-34.
72. Prince, supra note 6, at 1587.
73. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). In Roman mythology, Bacchus (equated with the
Greek god Dionysus) was the god of the vine and the inventor of wine and the art
of tending grapes.
J.M. Hunt, Greek Mythology: The Lessor Gods,
http://www.desy.de/gna/interpedia/greek_myth/lessorgod.html#Dionysus (last
visited Feb. 15, 2006). “[Bacchus] has a dual nature. On the one hand bringing
joy and divine ecstasy. On the other, brutal, unthinking rage. Thus, reflecting
both sides of wines [sic] nature.” Id. The son of Zeus and Semele, [Bacchus] was
the only god with a mortal parent, and one of the few able to bring the dead from
the underworld. Id. [Bacchus] is associated with wanton behavior, and his
festivals (the Bacchanalia, celebrated March 16th and 17th) got so out of hand
that they were banned by the Roman Senate. Micha F. Lindemans, Bacchus,
ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA: ROMAN MYTHOLOGY, http://www.pantheon.org/areas/
mythology/europe/roman/articles.html (follow “Bacchus” hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 15, 2006). How fitting that a case named after the god of wine should be the
one to hold that wine should flow more freely!
74. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265. In order to encourage the development of the
Hawaiian liquor industry, the State enacted a law exempting okolehao (brandy
made from the root of the native ti plant) and pineapple wine from the Hawaiian
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exemption was a clear violation of the Commerce Clause, “because
it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of
75
local products.” The Court held that the statute was an invalid
exercise of Twenty-first Amendment power and disposed of the
Young’s Market precedent stating that “the Amendment did not
entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the
76
ambit of the Commerce Clause.”
The Court then applied a
balancing test, stating that a discriminatory statute would be
constitutional only if the “principles underlying the Twenty-first
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by [the statute] . . . to
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be
77
offended.”
F.

Beyond Bacchus

The confusion generated by Bacchus’s balancing test is evident
in the lower court cases decided since the Bacchus decision. The
direct shipment question in Granholm was previously addressed by
six circuit courts, all of which came to widely varying conclusions.
Four courts have followed the reasoning in Bacchus by applying
variations of its balancing test and ultimately striking down
78
discriminatory statutes. Two courts have fallen back on the liberal
liquor tax. Id.
75. Id. at 273. In making this determination, the Court relied on a “cardinal
rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence” that a State may not enact a tax which
discriminates against out-of-state products and provides an advantage to in-state
products. Id. at 268.
76. Id. at 275.
77. Id. Since the statute was enacted as “mere economic protectionism” and
was not intended to “combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor
. . . promote temperance or . . . carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-first
Amendment,” it was unconstitutional. Id. at 276. The “central purpose of the
[Twenty-first Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor
industries by erecting barriers to competition.” Id.
78. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e conclude
that the regulations in question are discriminatory in their application to out-ofstate wineries, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and cannot be
justified as advancing the traditional ‘core concerns’ of the Twenty-first
Amendment.”), aff’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005);
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 407 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Texas may not use the
Twenty-first Amendment as a veil to hide from constitutional scrutiny its parochial
economic discrimination against out-of-state wineries.”); Beskind v. Easley, 325
F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003) (“North Carolina’s regulatory preference of in-state
wine manufacturers discriminates against out-of-state wine manufacturers and
sellers, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and . . . the preference is
‘not supported by any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment.’” (quoting

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/16

12

Lex: Of Wine and War: The Fall of State Twenty-first Amendment Power a
14LEX.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:36:08 PM

GRANHOLM V. HEALD

1157

interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment originally espoused
by the Supreme Court, upholding discriminatory direct-shipment
statutes as a valid exercise of the State’s plenary power to regulate
79
liquor importation. The two cases consolidated by the Supreme
Court in Granholm clearly illustrate this split in reasoning.
III. FACTS OF THE GRANHOLM CASE
A.

The Three-Tier System and the Challenged Statutes

As did most states in the years following Prohibition, Michigan
and New York used their Twenty-first Amendment power to
80
Under this
establish a three-tier system of alcohol regulation.
system, liquor manufacturers, whether located in or out of state,
must sell their products to in-state wholesalers; wholesalers may sell
81
only to in-state retailers; and retailers may then sell to consumers.
As a general rule, this system applies to all liquor sold within a state,
although some states allow certain exceptions, usually for
82
producers of wine.
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276)); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir.
2002) (“Before the State can successfully raise the Twenty-first Amendment as a
shield, it must show that its statutory scheme is necessary to effectuate the
proffered core concern [of the Amendment] in a way that justifies treating out-ofstate firms differently from in-state firms . . . .”).
79. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227
F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (“No longer may the dormant commerce clause be
read to protect interstate shipments of liquor from regulation.”).
80. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228; Engler, 342 F.3d at 520; Prince, supra note 6,
at 1591.
81. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893; Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228; Engler, 342 F.3d
at 520; Prince, supra note 6, at 1591. States that adopted this system justified it on
the grounds that it “ensures the orderly collection of taxes, prevents the vertical
and horizontal integration of the state alcohol market, and helps fulfill
temperance goals.” Prince, supra note 6, at 1591.
82. Motivation for discriminatory protection of wine is stronger than for
other alcoholic beverages because of “[t]he existence in many states of significant
wine production destined primarily for local consumption” and the tendency of
wine producers to purchase their materials locally. Note, Economic Localism in State
Alcoholic Beverage Laws–-Experience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1153 (1959). A major motivation for laws giving advantages to in-state wine
producers is the desire to protect and encourage local agriculture.
Id.
Consequently, these laws give advantages where the “ultimate benefits” are likely
to accrue to local growers. Id. “It is notable that most statutes extend preferential
treatment only to wines produced from agricultural products grown in the state.”
Id.
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In Michigan, a license is available for in-state wineries allowing
them to ship directly to consumers, bypassing two tiers of the three83
tier system. This privilege is not available to out-of-state wineries,
which may ship into the state, but are required to ship to a
84
85
Michigan wholesaler. The plaintiffs in Heald v. Engler claimed
that this discriminatory law violated the dormant Commerce Clause
by giving in-state wineries a competitive advantage over out-of-state
86
wineries.
Similarly, in New York, licensed wineries may bypass the three87
tier system and ship wine directly to consumers. In theory, this
88
privilege is fully available to out-of-state wineries. All that is
required to become a licensed New York winery is the
establishment and maintenance of a physical presence in New
89
York. Out-of-state wineries may ship to New York customers as
90
long as they open a branch in New York. However, the plaintiffs
91
in Swedenburg v. Kelly contended that this law was also
unconstitutionally discriminatory, thereby disadvantaging out-of92
state wineries by effectively prohibiting direct shipment of wine.
B.

Heald v. Engler: The Balancing Approach

The Sixth Circuit applied the test as set forth in Bacchus and
held that the Michigan law was unconstitutional and could not be
characterized as a proper exercise of Twenty-first Amendment
93
power. The court stated that the law’s “discriminatory character
83. Engler, 342 F.3d at 520-21.
84. Id.
85. 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
86. Id. at 521. The plaintiffs claimed that in-state wineries could bypass
wholesalers and retailers and avoid their attendant mark-ups, making in-state
wines cheaper for consumers in some cases, and allowing the in-state wineries to
realize a greater profit. Id.
87. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Granholm Court described the presence requirement as costprohibitive, evidenced by the fact that “not a single out-of-state winery has availed
itself of New York’s direct-shipping privilege.” Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897. “For
most wineries, the expense of establishing a bricks-and-mortar distribution
operation in 1 State, let alone all 50, is prohibitive.” Id.
93. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524-26 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nom.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
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eliminates the immunity afforded by the Twenty-first
94
Amendment.” The district court had upheld the statute, relying
on the Supreme Court’s opinions in the Young’s Market line of
cases, but the Sixth Circuit held that this reliance was misplaced
since the Hostetter and Bacchus decisions had signaled a shift in the
95
Supreme Court’s reasoning. The court of appeals held that the
correct approach was “to apply the traditional dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and, if the provisions are unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause, to determine whether the state has shown
that it has no reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing
96
the ‘core concerns’ of the Twenty-first Amendment.”
Applying this test to the Michigan direct-shipment law, the
court noted that discriminatory statutes “are ‘virtually per se’
97
invalid” under the Commerce Clause unless they serve “‘a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
98
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”
The court found
99
It
that the Michigan statute was clearly facially discriminatory.
then addressed whether “the regulatory scheme [was] nevertheless
constitutional because it ‘fall[s] within the core of the State’s power
under the Twenty-first Amendment,’ having been enacted ‘in the
interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
100
conditions, and raising revenue.’”
The court held that it was
101
According to the court, the Michigan Legislature’s stated
not.
goals of ensuring tax collection and keeping alcohol out of the
hands of minors were not enough to pass the “strict scrutiny” that
the court imposes on statutes that discriminate against interstate

94. Id. at 524 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
95. Id. at 523-24.
96. Id. at 524.
97. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
98. Id. at 525 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
99. Id. The discriminatory effect is demonstrated by the fact that Michigan
wineries have greater access to consumers who desire direct shipment and are able
to realize a greater profit by bypassing the three-tier system. Id. In contrast, outof-state wineries are harmed economically by their inability to bypass the system
and may not be able to gain access to the Michigan market at all. Id.
100. Id. at 525-26 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1990)). The North Dakota Court proposed these three factors—promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue—as the
“core concerns” underlying the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 523-24.
101. Id. at 526.
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102

Swedenburg v. Kelly: The Unconditional Grant Approach

The Second Circuit in Swedenburg reached the opposite result.
The court held that the balancing approach utilized by the Engler
court and other courts was “flawed because it has the effect of
unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated to the states through
103
the clear and unambiguous language of section 2.”
While the
Sixth Circuit interpreted Hostetter as mandating a balancing test
between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment,
the Swedenburg court read the Hostetter decision as proposing a
104
different test.
According to the Second Circuit, a court should
consider “the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment’s grant of
authority to the states to determine whether the challenged statute
is within the ambit of that authority, such that it is exempted from
105
the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause.”
The Second Circuit interpreted the recent Supreme Court
cases not as placing limits on the states’ Twenty-first Amendment
106
power, but as upholding limits already there.
Rather than
subordinating the Twenty-first Amendment to the Commerce
Clause when there is a conflict, the court recognized that “under
section 2, a state may regulate the importation of alcohol for
distribution and use within its borders, but may not intrude upon
federal authority to regulate beyond the state’s borders or to
107
preserve fundamental rights.”
The court characterized the
opinions seeming to limit Twenty-first Amendment power as simply
recognizing that the Commerce Clause still applies to liquor
108
outside of the powers granted to the states.
The court upheld
102. Id. at 527.
103. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom.
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
104. Id.
105. Id.; see Patterson, supra note 53, at 780 (“The sole ‘question is whether the
provision in this case is an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon the States
by the Constitution.’” (quoting Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 359-60 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))).
106. See Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 233.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 236; see also Patterson, supra note 53, at 774 (“[P]roponents of the
unconditional grant theory have never argued that the Twenty-first Amendment
operates to completely divest Congress of the power to regulate alcohol. Rather,
they have argued that the Twenty-first Amendment operates to repeal the
Commerce Clause as it pertains to state laws regulating the importation and
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New York’s direct shipment law as being within the scope of
109
authority granted to the states by the Twenty-first Amendment.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A.

The Majority—Finally Finding a Balance?

The Supreme Court in Granholm sided with the Sixth Circuit,
maintaining its Bacchus stance that a balancing approach is
required for statutes that discriminate against out-of-state liquor in
110
The Court laid out the facts
violation of the Commerce Clause.
of the cases and commented on the obviously discriminatory
111
It then
character of both the Michigan and New York laws.
explained that the States’ position, that their statutes are valid
under the Twenty-first Amendment despite their discriminatory
effect, was “inconsistent with our precedents and with the Twenty112
first Amendment’s history.” The Court held that the Twenty-first
Amendment “does not allow states to regulate the direct shipment
113
of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.”
The Supreme Court based its holding primarily on its (1)
interpretation of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and those Acts’
effect on the Scott decision, (2) treatment of the Young’s Market line
of cases, and (3) interpretation and application of the Bacchus
decision.
distribution of alcohol.”).
109. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 239. Interestingly, although the Swedenburg
court’s holding does not seem to require this finding, after stating that the statute
was “within the ambit” of Twenty-first Amendment power, the court went on to
explain that the statute allows access to the New York market for both in-state and
out-of-state wine “in a non-discriminatory manner, while targeting valid state
interests in controlling the importation and transportation of alcohol.” Id.
Although “core concerns” do not enter into the court’s calculation, this reference
could be taken as implying either that the court was somewhat unsure of its
analysis of the statute or that it would have reached an identical holding had it
applied a Bacchus balancing test.
110. See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2005).
111. Id. at 1893-97. The Michigan law was discriminatory because out-of-state
wineries were banned completely from shipping to in-state consumers. Id. at 1896.
Forcing these wineries to utilize the three-tier system increased costs and for some
small wineries it had the effect of barring them from the Michigan market if they
were unable to secure a wholesaler to carry their product. Id. The New York
system accomplished indirectly what the Michigan system accomplished directly.
Id.; see supra note 92.
112. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897.
113. Id.
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The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and the Scott Case

The majority interpreted the Wilson Act as prohibiting
discrimination “[b]y its own terms,” since the Act allows states to
regulate imported liquor only “‘to the same extent and in the same
114
manner’” as liquor produced in the state.
The majority
115
explained that Scott confirms this understanding of the Act. Scott
involved a challenge to a liquor regulation system that required all
liquor sales to be “channeled through the state liquor
116
commissioner.”
This statute was discriminatory because it
required the Commissioner to purchase in-state alcohol whenever
it was as cheap as out-of-state alcohol, and it limited the state’s
markup on locally produced wine while imposing no such limit on
117
imported wine.
The Scott Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional since “the Wilson Act was ‘not intended to confer
upon any State the power to discriminate injuriously against the
products of other States in articles whose manufacture and use are
not forbidden, and which are therefore the subjects of legitimate
118
commerce.’”
According to the majority, Vance and Rhodes clarified that states
could not prohibit direct shipments to consumers under the
119
Wilson Act.
The Vance Court “characterized Scott as embodying
two distinct holdings: first, the South Carolina dispensary law
‘amount[ed] to an unjust discrimination against liquors, the
products of other States’”; and second, banning direct shipments to
consumers was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce
120
Clause.
The Granholm majority concluded that the second
holding was implicit in Scott, but Vance and Rhodes later clarified
121
and expanded it.
The Webb-Kenyon Act was enacted thereafter simply to
respond to the gap that the Wilson Act left open requiring states to
122
allow direct shipments of alcohol to consumers.
The majority
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the Webb-Kenyon Act “removed
114. Id. at 1899 (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000)).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 100 (1897)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1899-1900 (quoting Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438,
422 (1898)).
121. Id. at 1900.
122. Id.
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any barrier to discriminatory state liquor regulations,” stating that
the Court in Clark Distilling construed the Webb-Kenyon Act as
enacted “‘simply to extend that which was done by the Wilson
124
Act.’”
Since the Wilson Act did not allow discriminatory liquor
125
regulation, neither did the Webb-Kenyon Act.
The Court also rejected the idea that the plain language of the
Webb-Kenyon Act allows discriminatory legislation, citing
126
McCormick & Co. v. Brown to support the conclusion that the
Webb-Kenyon Act, although forbidding shipment or transportation
in violation of any state law, applies only to “valid” state laws,
127
meaning laws that do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court held that the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace Scott’s
holding that states must regulate in-state and out-of-state liquor on
128
equal terms.
2.

What Happened to Young’s Market?

The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the
Twenty-first Amendment provides states with the authority to enact
129
discriminatory statues. The majority explained that the history of
the Amendment “provides strong support for the view that
[Section] 2 restored to the states the powers they had under the
Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,” since the wording of the

123. Id. at 1901.
124. Id. (quoting Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324
(1917)).
125. Id.
126. 286 U.S. 131 (1932).
127. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1901 (quoting McCormick & Co., 286 U.S. at 141).
The Court notes that the Webb-Kenyon Act evinced “no clear congressional intent
to depart from the principle, unexceptional at the time the Act was passed and still
applicable today . . . that discrimination against out-of-state goods is disfavored.”
Id. (citing Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); W. & S. Life Ins. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981)).
128. Id. at 1902.
[T]he intent of . . . the Webb-Kenyon Act . . . was to take from
intoxicating liquor the protection of the interstate commerce laws in so
far as necessary to deny them an advantage over the intoxicating liquors
produced in the state into which they were brought, yet, [the Act does
not] show an intent or purpose to so abdicate control over interstate
commerce as to permit discrimination against the intoxicating liquor
brought into one state from another.
Id. (quoting Pac. Fruit & Produce Co. v. Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34, 39-40 (W.D. Wash.
1936)).
129. Id.
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130

Amendment closely tracks that of the Acts. The Court stated:
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for
controlling liquor by regulating its transportation,
importation, and use. The Amendment did not give
States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to
discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they
131
had not enjoyed at any earlier time.
The Court gave short shrift to Young’s Market and its progeny,
holding that these cases did not take account of and were
132
The Court
inconsistent with the history the Court had set forth.
rejected the reasoning in Young’s Market outright in favor of “more
recent cases . . . [which] confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment
does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in
particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give a
133
discriminatory preference to their own producers.”
3.

The Bacchus Balancing Act

The majority also declined to acquiesce to the plaintiffs’
suggestion that Bacchus should be overruled or distinguished,
stating that Bacchus “forecloses any contention that [Section] 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment immunizes discriminatory direct134
shipment laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny.”
After determining that the statutes were clearly
135
discriminatory and that this discrimination was not authorized by
136
the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court turned to the question
whether either states’ statute “advance[d] a legitimate local
purpose that [could not] be adequately served by reasonable
137
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”
The Court decisively rejected
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1902-03.
133. Id. at 1903.
134. Id. at 1904. The Court suggested that Bacchus was not anomalous in its
recognition that the Twenty-first Amendment does not allow States to enact
discriminatory regulations. Id. The Court noted that Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) and Healy v. Beer Institute, 491
U.S. 324 (1989) would also be invalidated if Bacchus were overruled since they also
invalidated state liquor regulations under the Commerce Clause. Id.
135. Id. at 1896-97.
136. Id. at 1897.
137. Id. at 1905 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
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the two justifications advanced by the States attempting to show
that they could not adequately police out-of-state direct
138
shipments.
The States first advanced the justification that allowing directshipments of wine from out out-of-state diminished their ability to
139
prevent underage drinking.
The Court found that the States’
140
evidence to support this justification was less than convincing. It
stated that minors are less likely to consume wine than other types
of liquor, and in any case, are just as likely to order wine from in141
state producers as from out-of-state producers. The Court found
that other non-discriminatory means were available to address this
142
problem if indeed it really was a problem.
The Court also
summarily dismissed the States’ second concern—the facilitation of
143
The Court held that while the
tax collection—as “insufficient.”
States’ concern about tax revenue was not “wholly illusory,” the
States could accomplish these objectives through non144
discriminatory means.
Since the States had not offered any
“concrete record evidence” to show that “nondiscriminatory
alternatives [would] prove unworkable,” the Court held the states’
direct-shipment laws to be an unconstitutional violation of the
145
Commerce Clause.
B.

Justice Thomas’s Dissent

Justice Thomas in his dissent took issue with each of the points
addressed by the majority. He poignantly stated:
A century ago, this Court repeatedly invalidated, as
inconsistent with the negative Commerce Clause, state
138. Id. at 1905-07. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on a report from the
Federal Trade Commission, which compiled detailed data on the wine industry
and barriers to direct shipment. Id. at 1905; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETETIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf.
139. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1905-06; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 138, at 4 (noting that
states that permit direct shipment of out-of-state wines report few problems with
sales to minors and have found other effective ways to address this concern).
142. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 138, at 4 (noting that states which
allow direct shipment have reported few problems with tax collection when they
require permits for wineries who wish to ship to in-state customers).
145. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1907.
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liquor legislation that prevented out-of-state businesses
from shipping liquor directly to a State’s residents. The
Webb-Kenyon Act and the Twenty-first Amendment cut
off this intrusive review, as their text and history make
clear and as this Court’s early cases on the Twenty-first
Amendment recognized. The Court today seizes back this
power, based primarily on a historical argument that this
146
Court decisively rejected long ago in [Young’s Market].
1.

The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and the Scott Case

The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thomas,
characterized the Court’s holding as “[s]traying from the Webb147
Kenyon Act’s text,” in that the holding required the Court to
interpret the Webb-Kenyon Act as overruling only Vance and Rhodes
148
and leaving Scott intact. According to Justice Thomas, “[h]istory
reveals that the Webb-Kenyon Act overturned not only Vance and
Rhodes, but also Scott and therefore its ‘nondiscrimination’
149
principle.”
His dissent noted that when Congress promulgated
the Wilson Act in an effort to allow states to regulate liquor
imports, “[r]ather than holding that the Wilson Act meant what it
said, three decisions of this Court construed the Act to be a virtual

146. Id. at 1909-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor,
and Chief Justice Rhenquist also joined in this dissent. Id. at 1909.
147. Id. at 1913. Justice Thomas gave much attention in his dissent to the
plain meaning of the Webb-Kenyon Act. Id. at 1910-13. He posited that the Act
“immunizes from negative Commerce Clause review the state liquor laws that the
Court holds are unconstitutional.” Id. at 1910. According to Justice Thomas, the
Act’s prohibition of liquor importation into a state in violation of “‘[a]ny law of
such State’ means any law, including a ‘discriminatory’ one.” Id. at 1911
(emphasis added). He disputed the Court’s characterization of the holding in
Clark Distilling, stating that even though that case upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in
the context of a non-discriminatory law, the Court’s characterization of the Act in
that case applies equally to a discriminatory law. Id. at 1912. Clark Distilling
“construed the Webb-Kenyon Act to ‘extend that which was done by the Wilson
Act’ in that its ‘purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate
commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such
commerce in States contrary to their laws.’” Id. (quoting Clark Distilling Co. v. W.
Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (2005)). Justice Thomas emphasized that the
majority’s interpretation of this passage as referring only to nondiscriminatory laws
was misguided. Id. He believed that this passage also applied to the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause since this “principle flows from
the ‘immunity characteristic of interstate commerce,’ no less than any other
negative Commerce Clause doctrine.” Id.
148. Id. at 1913.
149. Id.
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150

nullity.”
Justice Thomas interpreted Scott differently than the majority.
He explained that the plaintiff was a resident of South Carolina
who had tried to directly import liquor for his own use, rather than
purchasing it through the State Commissioner as the monopoly
151
system required.
When the State seized this liquor before he
received it, he sued for damages and an injunction allowing him to
152
import liquor directly for his own use. Justice Thomas explained
that the majority misread Scott when it stated that the main holding
was that statutes that discriminate against out-of-state liquor are
153
unconstitutional.
According to Thomas, Scott actually held “that
the state monopoly system unconstitutionally discriminated against
Donald by allowing him to purchase liquor from in-state stores, but
154
not directly from out-of-state interests.”
Thus, the direct
shipment question was not only implicit in Scott, it was “squarely at
155
issue.”
According to Justice Thomas, the Scott Court struck down
South Carolina’s monopoly system not based on discriminatory
provisions within the statute, but based on its belief that “a ban on
direct importation was ‘discrimination’ under the negative
156
Commerce Clause.”
This was the only basis on which the Court
could have upheld the plaintiff’s award of damages for
“interference with his ability to import goods directly from outside
157
the State.”
The Scott Court reserved the issue of whether a state
monopoly system that allowed direct importation was
158
Later, Vance upheld South Carolina’s new
constitutional.
monopoly system that allowed direct shipments, because it had
“preserved the constitutional right established in Scott and Rhodes to
send and receive direct shipments of liquor free of state
159
interference.”
When Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act shortly
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1914.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1918.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Thomas noted that Justice Shiras, who
authored the Scott opinion, believed that all state monopoly systems were
unconstitutionally discriminatory. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1914.
159. Id. at 1917.
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thereafter, in response to the treatment these cases gave to the
160
Wilson Act, it overruled all three cases, not just Vance and Rhodes.
Because the direct shipment ban was at the heart of the Scott case
and the essence of its holding was that a ban on direct shipment
was unconstitutional discrimination, the Webb-Kenyon Act also
overruled Scott by closing the direct shipment loophole and
removing the protections of the Commerce Clause from liquor
161
imports.
Therefore, the Webb-Kenyon Act, Justice Thomas
remarked, “authorizes the discriminatory state laws before the
162
Court today.”
2.

Young’s Market Should Be Upheld

Justice Thomas explained that his reading of the WebbKenyon Act is dispositive of the case, but even under the Twentyfirst Amendment and subsequent case law, the Michigan and New
163
York statutes should be upheld.
He noted that the Twenty-first
Amendment tracks the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, but is
broader in that it encompasses all transportation and importation
of products destined for in-state use that violates the laws of that
164
state.
According to Justice Thomas, this language “even more
165
naturally encompasses discriminatory state laws.”
Thomas’s dissent defended the Court’s post-Twenty-first
Amendment holdings in Young’s Market and its progeny, stating
that these cases held explicitly that discriminatory laws were
166
constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment.
Rather than
failing to consider the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, as
the majority proposed, the Court in Young’s Market decisively
rejected “virtually the same historical argument the Court today
167
accepts” in favor of a holding based on the plain language of the
Twenty-first Amendment, reasoning that “the text of our
168
Constitution is the best guide to its meaning.”
Justice Thomas
would have upheld Young’s Market. He argued that the majority
gave too little weight to the opinions and practices contemporary to
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1919.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1920.
Id.
Id.
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169

the Amendment.
3.

Bacchus Should Be Abandoned

Justice Thomas did not believe that Bacchus demanded the
conclusion that the majority reached, but he would have resolved
any conflict in favor of the Court’s earlier Twenty-first Amendment
170
He stated that even under Bacchus, the New York and
cases.
171
Michigan statutes were constitutional.
In Bacchus, the Court struck down a Hawaii tax exemption
because it was “mere economic protectionism,” and the State did
not justify it under any core concern of the Twenty-first
172
Amendment.
In contrast, Justice Thomas concluded that the
statutes of Michigan and New York were constitutional because they
advanced the core concern of allowing states to regulate direct
shipment of liquor, which was an issue of concern to the drafters of
the Amendment, as evidenced by the Webb-Kenyon Act’s haste to
173
Even if one concedes that
close the direct-shipment loophole.
the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize merely
protectionist liquor legislation, the laws at issue in Granholm did not
174
fall under that category.
The states’ requirements, that out-ofstate liquor pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer, serve
valid regulatory interests since their “‘presence ensures
175
accountability.’” The laws simply allow in-state wineries to “act as
176
their own wholesalers and retailers in limited circumstances.”
The dissent stated that “Bacchus should be overruled, not
fortified with a textually and historically unjustified
177
‘nondiscrimination against products’ test.” Although the Twentyfirst Amendment did not “repeal” the Commerce Clause as it
relates to liquor, “that does not justify Bacchus’ narrowing of the
178
Twenty-first Amendment to its ‘core concerns.’”

169. Id. at 1921.
170. Id. at 1924.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1924-25.
175. Id. at 1925 (quoting Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir.
2004), rev’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Justice Stevens’s Dissent

Justice Stevens’s dissent had a different focus. He argued that
the Court should give deference to the judges who authored the
Young’s Market line of opinions, which broadly interpreted the
States’ power under the Twenty-first Amendment, since they “lived
through the debates that led to the ratification of [the Eighteenth
179
and Twenty-first Amendments].”
He stated that at the time the
Amendment was ratified, the idea that
discriminatory state laws violated the unwritten
prohibition against balkanizing the American economy—
while persuasive in contemporary times when alcohol is
viewed as an ordinary article of commerce—would have
seemed strange indeed to the millions of Americans who
condemned the use of the “demon rum” in the 1920’s and
1930’s.
Indeed, they expressly authorized the
180
“balkanization” that today’s decision condemns.
While many Americans today view alcohol as “an ordinary
article of commerce,” this was not the dominant view in the times
that produced Prohibition and its subsequent repeal in favor of
181
state control. According to Justice Stevens’s “understanding (and
recollection) of the historical context” of the Twenty-first
Amendment, it should be “broadly and colloquially interpreted” as
182
the people who ratified it intended.
V. ANALYSIS
In 2004, one ambitious “wine guru” predicted the “total
183
After
collapse” of the three-tier system within ten years.
Granholm, this prophesy is even more likely to come to pass. While
arguable, the Court’s interpretation of the precedents on which its
decision rests is not altogether unreasonable; the major flaw in the
Court’s reasoning is that it completely failed to consider the impact
179. Id. at 1908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1909.
181. Id. at 1908.
182. Id. at 1909 (quoting Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 141 (1944)). Justice
John Paul Stevens was born on April 20, 1920, and he grew up during the era of
Prohibition and its repeal. Jerry Goldman, Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia,
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/101/ (last visited Feb. 15,
2006).
183. Melzer, supra note 49, at 299 (quoting Robert M. Parker Jr., Parker Predicts
the
Future,
FOOD & WINE,
Oct.
2004,
at
120,
available
at
http://www.foodandwine.com/articles/parker-predicts-the-future).
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of its decision on state liquor laws that have been in place since the
mid-1930s.
A.

Implications of the Non-Discrimination Principle

The Court held categorically that state laws discriminating
184
The three-tier system in
against out-of-state liquor are invalid.
use in most states, which according to the majority is
185
“unquestionably legitimate,” requires most liquor to pass through
in-state wholesalers and retailers. This means that out-of-state
retailers and wholesalers are unable to ship liquor to consumers in
another state. The majority mentioned that the three-tier system is
valid under the Twenty-first Amendment; however, these laws
186
The
clearly discriminate against out-of-state interests.
inconsistency in the Court’s position, as Justice Thomas pointed
out, is that while striking down laws that discriminate against out-ofstate manufacturers, the Court seemed to approve of laws that
187
discriminate against wholesalers and retailers.
Justice Thomas
commented that the distinction between discrimination that the
Court held unconstitutional and that which it held to be valid is
188
“difficult to understand.”
The reason the Court’s position is
difficult to understand is that it does not make sense.
The Granholm plaintiffs asserted that a decision invalidating
laws that ban direct-shipments of out-of-state wine based on their
discriminatory character would “call into question the
189
constitutionality of the three-tier system.” In response, the Court
190
simply stated that “[t]his does not follow from our holding.” The
Court noted that the “Twenty-first Amendment grants the States
virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or
sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution

184. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905 (“State policies are protected under the
Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as
its domestic equivalent. The instant cases, in contrast, involve straightforward
attempts to discriminate in favor of local producers. The discrimination is
contrary to the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment.”).
185. Id. at 1905 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1990)).
186. Id. at 1922 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1911.
188. Id. at 1923.
189. Id. at 1904-05 (majority opinion).
190. Id. at 1905.
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191

system.” The Court failed to consider the fact that any restriction
on liquor imports that is not accompanied by a complete in-state
ban on liquor sales is inherently discriminatory. In the same
breath, the Court both affirmed the nearly unlimited power of the
states under the Twenty-first Amendment and fashioned a weapon
192
by which it may gradually take that power away if it so chooses.
B.

Implications of the Commerce Clause Test

Of course, one may argue that the three-tier system is safe
under the second prong of the Commerce Clause balancing test—
that it “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
193
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”
From the text of the opinion, it seems unlikely that any
discriminatory liquor import law would be upheld under this
194
second prong.
The Court gave no indication as to what types of
justifications would meet the test. One may begin with the Bacchus
“core concerns,” but as Justice Thomas noted, although the Court
placed much weight on Bacchus, it “[did] not even mention, let
alone apply, the ‘core concerns’ test that Bacchus established. The
Court instead sub silentio cast aside that test, employing otherwise195
applicable negative Commerce Clause scrutiny.” In addition, the
Court dismissed two justifications of Michigan and New York for
the direct shipment laws that fall under two of the core concerns
196
previously proposed.
The two main justifications that the States advanced for the
direct-shipment statutes were “keeping alcohol out of the hands of
197
minors and facilitating tax collection.”
These two justifications
198
fall neatly under the categories of “promoting temperance” and
191. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
192. Id. at 1907.
193. Id. at 1905 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
194. See id. at 1907.
195. Id. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. Bacchus asserted promotion of temperance as one of the possible
purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment and alluded to, but did not specifically
delineate others. Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). North
Dakota expanded on Bacchus by identifying some of the Amendment’s core
concerns as “promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and
raising revenue.” North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
197. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905.
198. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432.
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199

“raising revenue.”
Nevertheless, the Court made short work of
them, stating that although these were valid goals, the States must
200
still accomplish them in a non-discriminatory manner.
States may defend their three-tier system under any one of the
proposed core concerns. However, Granholm has now shown that,
where discriminatory laws are at issue, two of these core concerns
are, at best, difficult to establish. One scholar noted that “the
three-tier system played a valuable role in the decades immediately
201
following the repeal of Prohibition.”
Its aims were “to collect
taxes, to reduce the hold organized crime had gained on the liquor
trade during Prohibition, and to prevent sales of alcohol to
202
minors.”
However, “[a]lthough the system was—and in many
respects still is—effective, it has not evolved and kept pace with the
expansion of the market. Consumer choice has, in fact, been
203
drastically limited.”
Some have even called it “an absurdly
204
inefficient system that costs the consumer big bucks.”
Organized crime is no longer a major problem in the liquor
industry, and the Court has already indicated that states have nondiscriminatory ways to collect taxes and keep alcohol from minors.
Given the Court’s focus on the free movement of goods in
205
interstate commerce, it would not be surprising if the Court
strikes down the three-tier system at some point in the coming years
either because it no longer serves a valid purpose under the
Twenty-first Amendment or because its purposes can be adequately
served by non-discriminatory means.

199. Id.
200. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906.
201. Lucas, supra note 5, at 906.
202. Id. at 906-07.
203. Id. at 907.
204. Parker, supra note 183, at 120. Parker noted that this “narrowly restricted
approach . . . is coming to a dramatic end—hastened in part by the comparative
ease of ordering wine over the Internet.” Id.
205. Justice Thomas states in his dissent:
The Court’s focus on [the effects of the states’ direct shipment laws on
the wine industry] suggests that it believes that its decision serves this
Nation well. I am sure that the judges who repeatedly invalidated state
liquor legislation, even in the face of clear congressional direction to the
contrary, thought the same. The Twenty-first Amendment and the
Webb-Kenyon Act took those policy choices away from judges and
returned them to the States. Whatever the wisdom of that choice, the
Court does this Nation no service by ignoring the textual commands of
the Constitution and Acts of Congress.
Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1927 (citation omitted).
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Taking a Step Backwards

So the question remains, what power has the Court left to the
states under the Twenty-first Amendment, if courts are likely to
hold all discriminatory laws unconstitutional? The Court’s decision
seems to require the view, espoused by some scholars, that the
206
Twenty-first Amendment protects only states that wish to be “dry.”
However, this view is neither supported by case law nor by the
practice of the states at the time Prohibition was repealed.
1.

Post-Prohibition Liquor Laws

The widespread and largely unquestioned practice of the states
following the Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification was to enact
207
liquor regulations, which were often discriminatory.
According
to Justice Thomas, this “confirm[s] that the [Twenty-first]
Amendment freed the States from negative Commerce Clause
208
restraints on discriminatory regulation.” He commented that this

206. The view that the power of the Twenty-first Amendment was intended
only to protect “dry” states from having to allow direct shipments into the states is
put forth by several scholars. Melzer described the two prominent views as the
“federalist” and “absolutist” views. Melzer, supra note 49, at 285. The federalist
view is that “section two merely protected dry states: that is, states that allowed the
importation, manufacture, or sale of intoxicating liquor gained no new powers visà-vis the federal government under the amendment.” Id. at 286. The absolutist
view proposed that “the section gave states plenary power to regulate the evils
associated with intoxicating beverages.” Id. Agarwal and Zywicki also posit that
the Twenty-first Amendment “enabled dry States to remain dry if they so chose,
but it did not empower wet states to engage in economic warfare against the
products of other wet States.” Asheesh Agarwal & Todd Zywicki, The Original
Meaning of the 21st Amendment, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 137, 138 (2005).
207. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting). After the repeal of
Prohibition, “[s]tates that made liquor legal imposed either state monopoly
systems, or licensing schemes strictly circumscribing the ability of private interests
to sell and distribute liquor within state borders.” Id. All of these laws were in
some way discriminatory. Id. For example, twenty-one states subjected out-of-state
alcohol producers to two layers of licensing fees by requiring them to purchase a
license to sell their products within the state. Id. at 1922. Thirteen states charged
in-state wine manufacturers lower licensing fees. Id. One state exempted in-state
wine producers from licensing entirely. Id. Eight states taxed out-of-state liquor at
a higher rate than in-state liquor. Id. Twenty-nine states “exempted exports from
excise taxes that were applicable to imports.” Id. Ten states required a special
license for “solicitors of out-of-state liquor products.” Id. Ten states charged
increased licensing fees to wholesalers that sold imported liquor. Id. Some states
had “antiretaliation statutes limiting or banning imports from other States that
themselves discriminated against out-of-state liquor.” Id.
208. Id. at 1921.
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209

practice reflects a “lay consensus” that discriminatory legislation
210
Rather
is “within the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment.”
than credit this “lay consensus,” the majority relied on “scattered
academic and judicial commentary arguing that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not permit States to enact discriminatory liquor
211
legislation.” Justice Thomas considered “the uniform practice of
the States whose people ratified the Twenty-first Amendment” to be
a more reliable gauge of its meaning than the “confused mishmash
212
of elite opinion” that drove the Court’s analysis.
2.

Case Law Interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment

Certainly, the failure of the Court to take into account the
prolific nature of discriminatory legislation, as a guide to the
intention of those who ratified the Twenty-first Amendment, is
troubling. Even more troubling is the Court’s treatment of the
precedent it used to justify its holding. The Court not only ignored
and misapplied controlling precedent, but it also resurrected longdead precedent to make the law fit its desired result.
One of the most troubling aspects of the majority’s decision is
its treatment of Young’s Market. Without expressly overruling
Young’s Market and its progeny, the Court rendered the decisions
wholly invalid. The Court did not even stop to consider what
reasoning might have prompted an entire line of cases to hold—
without one dissenting voice—that the Twenty-first Amendment
immunized state laws regulating liquor imports completely from
213
dormant Commerce Clause review.
In Granholm, the Court
adopted an interpretation of the Amendment that the Young’s
214
Market Court expressly rejected. The Young’s Market Court stated:
[The plaintiffs] request us to construe the amendment as
saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the importation of
209. Id. at 1923.
210. Id. at 1922.
211. Id. at 1923; see id. at 1903 (majority opinion) (citing case law and scholarly
works supporting the idea that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize
discriminatory liquor legislation).
212. Id. at 1923 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also weighed in on
this point stating that “the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment was the only
Amendment in our history to have been ratified by the people in state
conventions, rather than by state legislatures, provides further reason to give its
terms their ordinary meaning.” Id. at 1909 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. See supra Part II.D.
214. See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936).
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intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture
and sale within its boarders [sic]; but if it permits such
manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors
compete with the domestic on equal terms. To say that,
would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a
215
rewriting of it.
The Court’s justification for its dismissive treatment of these
cases is that it failed to consider the history underlying the Twenty216
As Justice Thomas
first Amendment in reaching its conclusions.
pointed out, the Young’s Market Court was presented with an
argument that the history of the Twenty-first Amendment
evidenced an intent to omit discriminatory liquor legislation from
its scope and rejected it outright in favor of an interpretation based
217
on the plain language of the Amendment. Considering the long
and tortured history of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Granholm
Court should have deferred to the interpretations of the Justices
218
who had firsthand knowledge of the events.
215. Id.
216. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903.
217. Id. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Young’s Market, 299 U.S. at 63-64.
218. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). After the
Supreme Court in Bacchus commented on the “obscurity of the legislative history”
of the Twenty-first Amendment, declaring that “[n]o clear consensus concerning
the meaning of the provision is apparent,” Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 274 (1984), the Court grounded its Granholm decision in the history and
purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902.
The Bacchus Court noted that Senator Blaine, the Senate sponsor for the
Twenty-first Amendment, “appears to have espoused varying interpretations” of
the Amendment. 468 U.S. at 274. Senator Blaine’s comments during the
ratification debates for the Twenty-first Amendment, though inconclusive, are a
main point of contention in the debate over the Amendment’s language.
Suggesting a narrow interpretation of the Amendment are the Senator’s words
that the purpose of the Amendment was “to assure the so-called dry States against
the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States.” Aaron Nielson, No More
‘Cherry-Picking’: The Real History of the 21st Amendment’s § 2, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 281, 287 (2004). However, Senator Blaine also made other remarks
indicating that he considered the purpose of the Amendment to be broader. Id.
He stated that the purpose of the Amendment was “to restore to the States by
constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce
affecting intoxicating liquors.” Id. Those who advocate a narrow interpretation of
the Amendment suggest that the Senator was simply being careless in his word
choice. Id. However, the two statements are not contradictory. Therefore, there
is no reason to think that the Senator intended the Twenty-first Amendment to be
limited to one purpose or the other. The broad interpretation of the Amendment
would encompass both statements. Lucas credits the “rush to ratify” the
Amendment and the “lack of attention paid to the details and to the potential
consequences” of the Amendment as key factors leading to the confusion about
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The Court grounded its decision largely in Bacchus, which on
219
The
its face appears to lend support to the Court’s position.
Court in that case held that liquor regulations are valid if “‘the
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to
the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the
regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements
220
directly conflict with express federal policies.’” But assuming that
221
Bacchus reached the right decision, it does not require the result
222
that the Granholm Court reached.
The State in Bacchus admitted
that its purpose in enacting the tax exemption was to encourage
223
local industry. The Bacchus Court’s holding was based on the fact
that the admitted purpose of the statute in the case was for
224
“economic protectionism.”
Even under a broad reading of the
Twenty-first Amendment, it is reasonable to assume that state laws
that serve no legitimate purpose in combating “the perceived evils
225
226
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor” might be invalid. However,
this is not the case in Granholm. Michigan and New York justified
the meaning of the Amendment. Lucas, supra note 5, at 919.
219. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (“The central purpose of the [Twenty-first
Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by
erecting barriers to competition.”).
220. Id. at 275-76 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714
(1984)).
221. This presumption is questionable. The Bacchus Court largely based its
decision on Hostetter, stating that this case was evidence that the Twenty-first
Amendment “did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from
the ambit of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 275. While it is true that Hostetter
recognized a limitation on Commerce Clause power, another case decided prior
to Bacchus makes clear that Hostetter’s holding did not limit states’ Twenty-first
Amendment power as much as Bacchus assumes. In North Dakota, the Court states
that “[i]n [Hostetter], we concluded that the State has no authority to regulate in
an area or over a transaction that fell outside of its jurisdiction.” North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990).
222. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1924 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Michigan and New York laws are constitutional even under Bacchus).
223. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271.
224. Id. at 276. The Court held that “State laws that constitute mere economic
protectionism are . . . not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to
combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.” Id. The Court
explained that “[h]ere, the State does not seek to justify its tax on the ground that
it was designed to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the
Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the purpose was ‘to
promote a local industry.’” Id.
225. Id.
226. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is little
evidence that purely protectionist tax exemptions like those at issue in Bacchus
were of any concern to the framers of the [Twenty-first Amendment].”).
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their laws not as mere economic protectionism, but as means to
227
In this case,
promote the goals of the Twenty-first Amendment.
the Court should have deferred to the judgment of the legislatures
in determining the best way for the states to accomplish these
228
goals.
3.

Back to Scott

Regardless of the majority’s interpretation of Young’s Market
and Bacchus, its action in skipping over seventy years of valid
precedent and reaching back into ancient history to resurrect a
case that has long been superseded by acts of Congress, a
constitutional Amendment, and later case law, was completely
unwarranted.
The majority conceded that its decision in Granholm takes the
state of the law back to where it was at the time of the Wilson and
229
Webb-Kenyon Acts. In fact, the decision takes the state of the law
farther back than that—all the way back to Scott. Assuming for the
sake of argument that the Court does not disturb the three-tier
system, the Granholm decision still does not remedy the
discrimination problem. The majority ruled simply that states may
not treat in-state and out-of-state liquors differently without
requiring states to remedy their discriminatory laws in any
particular way. Thus, states that currently ban or restrict direct
shipments from out-of-state have two options. They may either
allow all wineries, whether in or out-of-state, to ship directly to
consumers, or they may ban direct shipments entirely.
Assuming states decide to allow all direct imports of wine,
there is no problem with discrimination against out-of-state
wineries. However, if a state decides to ban direct shipments
altogether, the discrimination problem will not be solved. Those
small out-of-state wineries that rely on direct shipments and are
unable to secure in-state distributors to carry their products will still
be foreclosed from the state’s market. This outright ban on direct

227. See id. at 1924 (noting that allowing regulation of direct-shipments of
liquor was a clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment).
228. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1610 (“If direct-shipment laws have outlived
their usefulness, each state can certainly amend its own laws to accommodate this
cultural transformation.”).
229. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902 (majority opinion) (stating that there is
“strong support for the view that § 2 restored to the States the powers they had
under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts”).
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shipment creates as much of a burden on interstate commerce as a
ban on only out-of-state direct shipments. Consumers are still not
able to easily import the products of their choice. This is the exact
230
situation that Scott, Vance, and Rhodes held unconstitutional.
The only remedy for this problem, apart from abolishing the
three-tier system and most other state liquor laws, is to allow all
direct shipments of wine, and by extension, all direct shipments of
any type of liquor. This is the same state of affairs that the Court
imposed on the states in Scott, Vance, and Rhodes prior to the
Twenty-first Amendment. States were allowed to maintain whatever
sort of liquor distribution system they wanted so long as they
allowed direct shipment of out-of-state liquor to in-state consumers
231
nearly free of any restrictions.
This was also the state of affairs
that the Twenty-first Amendment attempted to abolish in 1933.
Although it does not concede as much, the Court in Granholm has
given itself the tools to take away nearly every shred of Twenty-first
Amendment power the states have enjoyed. It seems the result of
Granholm is that states now have two choices: remain completely dry
or be subjected to the unrestricted flow of out-of-state liquor.
VI. CONCLUSION
And so, the battle rages on. The wine wars are destined to
continue as the states attempt to discern the extent to which the
Granholm decision has disarmed them. The Court’s decision has
created more questions than answers. It is particularly unclear just
how much authority the states have after Granholm to regulate
liquor imports. Where Young’s Market had previously provided a
conclusive answer to this question, Granholm has undone all of that
and provided an avenue by which nearly every regulation on liquor
importation currently in place may fall victim to the whim of the
Court.
The Granholm decision may have reached the correct result for
today’s society. However, if that is the case, the Court should have
employed a different line of analysis in reaching this result. It was
the nature of liquor and society’s attitude towards it that led to
232
Prohibition and the Twenty-first Amendment in the first place.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the state monopoly system was invalid under Scott unless it allowed consumers to
purchase out-of-state liquor on the same terms as in-state liquor).
232. “The people of the United States knew that liquor is a lawlessness unto
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Likewise, it should be an analysis of the nature of liquor and
society’s current attitude towards it that determines whether that
law should be undone.
The original reason for affording states broad power to
regulate alcohol, even in violation of Commerce Clause principles,
is that alcohol is fundamentally different from other articles of
commerce. Perhaps this is no longer the case in a nation of fifty
“wet” states and an age of e-commerce, but we should not be so
quick to strike down seventy years of alcohol regulation without
first considering whether it has achieved and is achieving its
233
intended purpose.
The law of Scott changed in response to dissatisfaction with the
results it produced. The Court, in its Granholm decision, takes the
nation back to the Scott liquor regulation era, and it does so without
considering the potential consequences.
While the law is
susceptible to change, the Court should not do so without a full
analysis of the changes in society that require a departure from
precedent. Wine may get better with time, but failed constitutional
doctrines do not.
itself . . . . They did not leave it to the courts to devise special distortions of the
general rules as to interstate commerce to curb liquor’s ‘tendency to get out of
legal bounds.’” Prince, supra note 6, at 1585 (quoting Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314
U.S. 390, 398-99 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)). “It was their unsatisfactory
experience with that method that resulted in giving liquor an exclusive place in
constitutional law as a commodity whose transportation is governed by a special
constitutional provision.” Id.
233. Patterson notes that the focus of the courts in recent evaluations of the
constitutionality of state liquor laws has been on the intentions of the legislatures
in passing the laws. Patterson, supra note 53, at 782. He states that this focus has
the result of “strik[ing] down laws that promote temperance on the grounds that
they were not motivated by concern for temperance.” Id. Patterson states:
The lack of a national market in alcohol, however, is not an accidental
effect of an erroneous Supreme Court decision, and certainly does not
contradict longstanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Rather, an
implicit intention behind the passage of Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment was to ensure against the creation of a national market for
alcohol. Simply put, a national market for alcohol is incompatible with
the notion that some states may completely ban alcohol, and nearly
everyone involved in the debate over the Twenty-first Amendment agrees
that a state has the authority to completely ban alcohol within its
jurisdiction.
Id. at 788. Patterson proposes that a better course of action would be to abandon
the focus on the purpose of state alcohol regulations and return to a Young’s
Market analysis under which state liquor laws are exempt from dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny “if they pertain to the importation and distribution of alcohol
within state territories.” Id. at 784.
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